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REGULATING THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE:
FEDERALISM IN AN AGE OF DIFFICULT RISK
Robert H. Jerry, II*
Steven E. Roberts**
Every generation has experienced catastrophic loss, either at
the hands of nature, humankind, or both. In recent years, however,
the economic impact of catastrophic loss has increased to historic
levels. Of the ten most costly catastrophes in United States history
adjusted to current dollars, seven have occurred in the last five
years,' and six have occurred in the last two years.2 Most of these
catastrophes have been natural disasters, and almost all have been
hurricanes.' One leading catastrophe-modeling company recently
predicted that catastrophe losses "will double about every 10 years
due to increases in the numbers and values of properties at risk.
'
"
4
Largely due to Hurricane Katrina, catastrophe losses reached a total
of $58 billion in 2005, but according to this company's calculations,
there is a five percent chance that catastrophe losses in 2006 will be
greater than the record losses caused by Hurricane Katrina. 5
* Dean and Levin, Mabie and Levin Professor of Law, Fredric G. Levin
College of Law, University of Florida.
** Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University Law
School; J.D. 2006, Fredric G. Levin College of Law, University of Florida.
1. Insurance Information Institute, Catastrophes: Insurance Issues, June
2006, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/xxx (last visited June 21,
2006). Most were hurricanes: Katrina in 2005, Wilma in 2005, Charley in 2004,
Ivan in 2004, Rita in 2005, and Frances in 2004. The seventh is the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001. The three others are Hurricane Andrew in
1992, the Northridge, California, earthquakes in 1994, and Hurricane Hugo in
1989. Id.
2. See id. All six are hurricanes.
3. Id. For the twenty-year period from 1985 to 2004, tornado losses
(30.4%), winter storms (9.7%), earthquakes (8.4%), wind, hail, and flood (3.4%)
and fire (2.9%) were also major categories of catastrophe losses (with
catastrophe being defined as any event for which claims reach $25 million), in
addition to hurricanes (34.6%). Id.
4. Press Release, Insurance Information Institute, Catastrophe Losses
Will Double About Every 10 Years, Says Leading Catastrophe Modeling Expert
at PCS Conference, (Apr. 25, 2006), http://www.iii.org/media/updates/press.
753652 (quoting Karen Clark, President and CEO of AIR Worldwide Corp.).
5. Id. According to the Tropical Meteorology Project at Colorado State
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Yet the wild card in predicting catastrophe losses in the future
is not what nature has in store for us. Instead, the larger
uncertainty is the prospect of a human-generated terrorism
catastrophe. At some level, we all understand the risk of a
catastrophic nuclear event; the prospect of "mutual assured
destruction" that preoccupied us during the Cold War is fortunately
a concern of the past, but the emerging threat is the possibility that
proliferation of nuclear weapons could empower a rogue nation to
inflict unprecedented destructive force on the United States. In the
realm of lessons already learned is the reality of September 11,
2001, when we were taught that political organizations lacking the
cohesiveness of a nation-state now have the capability to cause
devastating loss of life and property damage on U.S. soil. Nor does
the entirety of this threat come from abroad, as demonstrated by the
loss of life and the destruction of a major government facility in
Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. There is reason to hope that the
post-Oklahoma City and post-9/11 efforts to disrupt the activities of
terrorists have reduced the risk of another major terrorism event,
but the reality is that no array of preventive measures is perfect,
and over the long term, the question is not whether another major
terrorism incident will occur on U.S. soil, but when.
Natural disasters and terrorism events of the massive scale
described above are "difficult risks."6 They are difficult (or, if large
enough, impossible) to insure, and they present enormous risk-
management challenges. Indeed, we are now in an era when
difficult risks are the dominant feature of the risk-management
landscape. These kinds of risks are inevitably multi-jurisdictional
in nature, and managing them effectively requires a cohesive,
comprehensive national catastrophe policy involving ex ante
prevention and mitigation measures, effective risk allocation
University, the prospects of a Category Three or higher hurricane making
landfall in the United States in 2006 is 82% (against a 52% average for the last
century), with a 64% probability of a U.S. east coast landfall and a 47% chance
of a U.S. Gulf coast landfall (versus historic averages of 31% and 30%
respectively). PHILIP J. KLOTZBACH & WILLIAM M. GRAY, COLORADO STATE
UNIVERSITY TROPICAL METEOROLOGY PROJECT, EXTENDED RANGE FORECAST OF
ATLANTIC SEASONAL HURRICANE AcTIvITY AND U.S. LANDFALL STRIKE
PROBABILITY FOR 2006 (MAY 2006), http://hurricane.atmos.colostate.eduI
Forecasts/2006/april2006.
6. The term "difficult risks" appears frequently in insurance literature
and trade publications as a label for catastrophic or cataclysmic events that are
difficult or impossible to insure. See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, A Previously
Unimaginable Risk Potential: September 11 and the Insurance Industry, 40 AM.
Bus. L.J. 687, 774 (2003) ("[Tlhe [insurance] industry has discovered methods
by which 'to assess and insure extremely large and difficult risks that were
initially considered uninsurable.'").
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through insurance mechanisms, and ex post victim-compensation
strategies. Although our nation is not yet close to establishing a
much-needed and increasingly discussed national catastrophe
policy, most significant points in current risk management
strategies involve significant federal coordination and control. In
our judgment, it would be peculiar-and less effective-if ex ante
risk-reduction and loss-mitigation strategies and ex post victim-
compensation programs were the province of the federal
government, but risk allocation and distribution decisions that are
made in insurance markets were left primarily to the regulatory
authority of the states. In other words, we suggest that a regulatory
model that defers to the states with respect to the regulation of the
insurance aspects of difficult risks is no longer viable, and an
enhanced federal role in insurance regulation specifically-and in
risk management more generally-is both necessary and
appropriate with respect to difficult risks.
I. OVERVIEW: THE TRADITION OF STATE DOMINANCE IN
REGULATING THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE
The story of how states came to be the dominant force in
regulating the insurance industry is told elsewhere and need not be
repeated here.' One of the important themes of the story is that
state regulation is dominant because Congress, through enactment
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1944, put the weight of its
Commerce Clause authority behind the system of state regulation
that had evolved earlier in the twentieth century." Just as Congress
affirmatively exercised its commerce power to declare what it would
leave to the states to regulate, Congress could exercise this same
power tomorrow to rearrange the relationship between federal and
state authority. Indeed, it is obvious, and Congress has done this on
some occasions (with ERISA being the most prominent example),
7. See generally ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 73-
97 (3d ed. 2002) (describing the evolution of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which
declared that continued regulation by the states of the business of insurance
was in the public interest).
8. Id. at 78.
9. Id. at 98 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000)) ("ERISA is a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme for employee benefit (i.e., pension and welfare) plans,
which are defined as a plan, fund, or program maintained or established by an
employer 'for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries,
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise,' certain fringe benefits .... ).
To create a consistent regulatory scheme for pensions, many of which are multi-
jurisdictional, ERISA preempts state laws relating to regulation of employee
benefit plans. But ERISA's drafters also sought to reserve to the states the
authority to regulate some areas where the states enjoyed primacy; thus, the so-
called "savings clause" reserves to the states continued regulation of the
2006
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that Congress can in any subsequent statute on any insurance
regulatory matter provide that a newly promulgated act take
precedence over the McCarran-Ferguson Act, thereby removing in a
sentence the reverse preemptive effect the McCarran-Ferguson Act
has on federal regulation. 10
Another theme of the story is that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's
reverse preemptive effect on federal regulation is not absolute.
Because at the time of the Act's enactment some state regulation
was correctly perceived as being ineffective, Congress used the Act
to create incentives for states to undertake more robust regulation.
The essence of the formula in the McCarran-Ferguson Act is that
Congress asserted its commerce power to preempt itself from
regulating the business of insurance to the extent the states filled
the regulatory vacuum. To the extent the states decline or fail to do
so, reverse preemption does not occur. This formula had the effect of
causing the states, with the help and support of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), to draft model
legislation that essentially filled the gaps where state regulation
was nonexistent or so passive as to call into question state primacy
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act's standards. In short, although
states have occupied the regulatory field, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's message is that where state regulation is ineffective, passive,
or nonexistent, federal regulation is appropriate.
The regulatory paradigm anchored by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act is the framework that has prevailed for the last six decades.
Periodically, efforts to modify the federal-state demarcation have
been made; although none of these efforts have succeeded, they have
sometimes led to regulatory change. For example, in the 1990s,
many brokers and insurers for large commercial risks urged a
federal regulatory system to reduce the alleged inefficiencies
inherent in dealing with the rules and regulations of fifty different
business of insurance. Yet, an exception to this reservation is created by the
"deemer clause," which has the effect of removing from the sphere of state
regulation self-insured employee benefits plans. The distinction drawn by the
deemer clause is that the business of insurance companies, which is regulated
by state law, is not preempted by ERISA; but the business of employee benefits
plans is subject to exclusive federal regulation, notwithstanding the fact that
self-insurance plans have many characteristics of traditional insurance. In
addition, to the extent courts have narrowly construed what constitutes the
"business of insurance," the scope of the zone of state regulation that is saved
from ERISA preemption is reduced, which has the effect of expanding the
federal regulatory role. Id. at 98, 99, 101, 103, 104. See also Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 143 (2001) (holding that ERISA supersedes state
statutes that regulate beneficiary designations in life insurance provided as
part of an ERISA plan).
10. See JERRY, supra note 7, at 76.
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states and the District of Columbia. This movement was taken
seriously by the states, which responded by becoming more receptive
to rate deregulation in commercial markets, which coincidentally
mooted the need to establish a federal regulatory presence in these
markets." In addition, in March 2002, the NAIC approved a model
law to reduce the oversight of commercial insurers' rate changes.
12
Many states have now gone further than the model and have
deregulated commercial insurance policy forms and rates. 3
Significant changes during the last decade in the financial
services industry are also putting pressure on the existing federal-
state accommodation.14  In July 2001, the American Insurance
Association ("AIA"), which represents approximately 300 property
and casualty insurance companies, proposed that insurers be
granted the option of obtaining a charter from a federal licensing
agency in lieu of being regulated in each state in which they do
business.15 The proposal to supplement state regulation with an
optional national charter system, which would make the insurance
regulatory regime look more like the dual system that currently
exists for banks, immediately prompted a flurry of responses, both
pro and con, from various insurance organizations.' 6 The AIA's
initiative seemed to be getting traction until other issues on the
national agenda, including government investigations into broker
compensation and industry accounting practices and the
consequences of Hurricane Katrina, diverted attention from it. But
the optional national charter initiative is not likely to disappear
from the agenda, as it has support from the life insurance industry,
several property/casualty industry groups, reinsurers, brokers,
banks that are moving into the insurance business, and some
individual companies. A competing proposal in Congress would
streamline state regulation by requiring states to comply with
uniform standards, adopt flex rating (which allows insurers to raise
rates within certain bands), adopt uniform licensing procedures, and
create systems that would accelerate the process of getting new
11. See Insurance Information Institute, Rates and Regulation, June 2006,
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/ratereg.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See JERRY, supra note 7, at 131. The origins of most of these changes
are the reforms inherent in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 133 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-10, 6821-27
(2000)).
15. See Catherine Tapia, AIA's Endorsement of Optional Federal Charter
Plan Prompts Flurry of Responses from Associations, INS. J., July 30, 2001,
http://insurancejournal.com/magazines/west/2001/07/30/features/18151.htm.
16. Id.
2006 839
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products onto the market. Unlike the dual-charter proposal, this
approach would not create a new federal regulatory agency, but
would establish a panel consisting of state insurance commissions
and representatives from some federal agencies to enforce
compliance. 7 In short, although a consensus exists that regulation
of the insurance business needs to be modernized, no consensus
exists on whether the existing system of state regulation should be
substantially preserved or whether a modified regulatory system
with an increased federal role should replace the current system.
For the present, however, regulation of the business of
insurance remains primarily the province of the states. Although
there are many who argue that placing the primary regulatory
authority in the states is sound public policy, 8 the most compelling
explanation for how this happened is that the federal-state
demarcation devolved from the exercise of power in the political
process. Industry groups and state regulators successfully pursued
their self-interest at the key moments when choices about
regulatory approaches needed to be made and other allocations of
federal-statute regulatory authority could have been adopted. In
the early twenty-first century, the nation's lack of a comprehensive
approach to the management of difficult risks creates another
opportunity for revisiting where the federal-state boundary in
insurance regulation should be drawn.
II. INSURANCE REGULATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
Insurance is only one method of managing risk. Indeed, the
purchase of insurance is often the final step in the implementation
of a risk-management strategy; it is the step taken when other
forms of risk management are inadequate or too costly. For
example, to the extent an individual or firm can limit the probability
of loss, the need for insurance is reduced. To the extent it is cheaper
to invest in loss prevention, the rational individual or firm will
follow this course instead of purchasing insurance. Common
examples of this strategy include adopting defensive driving habits
to reduce the risk of an accident, placing a guard on a machine in
the workplace, or constructing a building on a high ground instead
of in a floodplain. All of these things reduce the risk that loss will
occur, thereby reducing the need to insure for the consequences of
loss.
Limiting the impact of loss is another risk-management strategy
17. For more discussion, see Insurance Information Institute, Modernizing
Insurance Regulation, Apr. 2006, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/
XXX.
18. See JERRY, supra note 7, at 129.
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that reduces the need for insurance. For example, wearing a seat
belt will not prevent an auto accident, but it will reduce the
consequences of the accident when it happens. Installing a
sprinkler system will not prevent fires from igniting, but the system
will prevent the fire from spreading, thereby reducing the
consequence of the loss should it occur.
Self-insurance is another form of risk management. Instead of
purchasing insurance, which has the effect of transferring risk to a
third party, self-insurance involves retaining the risk and setting up
reserves to handle future losses. Deductibles, co-payments, and
retentions are classic risk-management methods in this genre.
Diversification is yet another risk-management strategy. For
example, a large business might set up operations in different
regions of the country in order to avoid the consequences of business
disruptions that are specific to one region and which would shut
down all operations in the event the enterprise's activities were
aggregated in that particular location.
Although regulation of the business of insurance is left to the
states, the federal government is deeply involved in risk regulation,
as distinct from insurance regulation. This presents an interesting
juxtaposition: the insurance industry operates in markets where
risk is transferred and distributed, and regulation of those markets
is the domain of the states (with some qualifications). But risk
management is something in which the federal government is
deeply involved and profoundly interested. 19 Harvard historian
David Moss has effectively documented the role both federal and
state governments have played in risk-management policy.
20
Bankruptcy laws, fixed exchange rates, and banking laws were
among the federal risk-management activities that were essential to
promoting the nation's economic development in the nineteenth
century." The Social Security Act of 1935 and its mandate of
compulsory unemployment and old-age insurance for workers was a
major piece of worker-security risk management in the twentieth
22
century. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a
dramatic increase in government regulation of risk, with the advent
of federal disaster relief during this era being a vivid example of this
transformation.23
19. See DAVID MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS 1 (2002).
20. Id. at 4-9.
21. Id. at 4-6, 85-15 1.
22. Id. at 6-8, 180-215.
23. Id. at 8-9, 254-64. Moss explains:
Whereas federal disaster relief covered just 6 percent of uninsured
losses from a major catastrophe in 1955, the figure had surged to
nearly 50 percent by 1972. In his memoirs Herbert Hoover looked
2006
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Similar to the strategies an individual or firm uses to deal with
risk, government has two primary methods of managing risk: first,
by attempting to reduce risk, which occurs when the government
regulates or prohibits risky activities (the regulatory activities of
OSHA present a classic example), and second, by seeking to
reallocate risk itself.24 Risk reallocation is a possible strategy when
private markets do not facilitate an efficient transfer and
distribution of risk through insurance mechanisms; if the
consequences of market failure are sufficiently disruptive, the
possibility exists that the government will mandate risk reallocation
through regulation. Realizing that insurance is but one of several
ways to manage risk, and given the federal government's active role
as risk manager, it is hardly radical to claim that the federal
government should have, both as a matter of an appropriate
federalist structure and as a matter of sound regulatory policy, a
greater role in the regulation of markets where risk is transferred
and distributed. It is to this topic that we now turn.
III. THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY DIFFICULT RISKS
A. The Nature of Difficult Risks
Judge Robert Keeton articulated this time-honored definition of
insurance: "Insurance is an arrangement for transferring and
distributing risk."25 "Arrangement" underscores that insurance is
contractual in nature; one party (the insured) makes a payment (the
premium) to another to induce that other party (the insurer) to
assume the first party's risk. The insurer enters into substantially
identical arrangements with large numbers of other similarly-
situated individuals; by taking advantage of the law of large
numbers and the reality of regression to the mean across large
samples,26 the insurer provides security to insureds at the same time
that it finds predictability in the large pools of risks that it
assembles. The predictability of loss in large pools enables the
back nostalgically to the 1920s, when the government's role in
disaster relief had been small. "Those were the days," he wrote,
"when citizens expected to take care of one another in time of disaster
and it had not occurred to them that the Federal Government should
do it." By the 1970s, those days were long gone.
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 1.
25. ROBERT E. KEETON, BAsIc TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 2 (1971).
26. To state the law of large numbers more precisely, the mean of a sample
approaches the expected value of a sample size as the sample size tends toward
infinity, i.e., the difference between the sample's mean and the expected value
shrinks as the size of the sample gets larger.
Vol. 41
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insurer to charge sufficient premiums so that plenty of funds are
reserved for future losses, the insurer is reimbursed for the
administrative costs of implementing the risk-distribution
arrangement, and the insurer earns a reasonable return.27  The
insured, in exchange for the periodic payment of a small sum,
escapes the risk of a large devastating loss. This is accomplished by
the insured essentially trading small, predictable, certain losses for
the risk of incurring an uncertain, but massive, loss.
As explained above, it is only when individuals or firms find
other approaches to risk management to be inadequate or too costly
to achieve the level of desired security that they turn to insurance
markets. For most risks confronted on a day-to-day basis (e.g., the
risk of death or injury, the risk of destruction of property, the risk of
liability to third parties), insurance markets function reasonably
well to transfer and distribute risk. With difficult risks, however,
private markets are less likely to transfer and distribute risk
effectively. When this occurs, government intervention in and
regulation of private markets may be necessary to assure that the
insurance necessary to the nation's economic well-being will be
available.
What, then, are the characteristics of difficult risks that
challenge the effective functioning of insurance markets? First and
foremost is resistance to diversification. As noted above, the
fundamental premise of an effective insurance market is the ability
to diversify risk through the law of large numbers. Diversification
works, however, only if the risks being pooled are independent of
each other. For example, if the risk being insured is the threat of
loss of crops due to flood, diversification is not achieved if all of the
crops being insured are in the same floodplain; the problem is that
27. Many risk transfers that are accompanied by consideration in our
society are not insurance. For example, an automobile purchased by a
consumer comes with a warranty, and the warranty is a risk-transference
mechanism. The risk of product defect or failure is retained by the
manufacturer for a period of time, and a portion of the product price pays for
this warranty. In calculating the automobile's price, the manufacturer will
suggest a price that is adequate, among other things, to cover what it expects to
be the product defect or failure rate across the large number of cars being
manufactured and sold. In a sense, a component of product price is the
purchase of insurance against product failure. But neither automobile sales nor
automobile warranties are regulated as insurance transactions essentially
because the core of the transaction is not the transfer of risk, but the sale of a
product. Stated otherwise, risk transfer is not the primary purpose of the
exchange; accordingly, the transaction is not regulated as insurance, even
though key components of the transaction have insurance characteristics.
What distinguishes an insurance transaction is that what is being bought and
sold-the commodity at the heart of the transaction-is risk itself.
8432006
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all of the risks being shared are highly (or, in this example,
perfectly) correlated because of a common element in the risk. This
lack of independence in the risks being pooled renders the risk-
pooling arrangement useless. Catastrophic risks, such as natural
disasters and large-scale terrorist events, present the situation
where diversification is difficult or impossible because every
member of a large population is likely to be affected adversely at the
same time.
Another characteristic of a difficult risk is ambiguity.
Ambiguity can have multiple facets, with two of the principal ones
being uncertainty of frequency and uncertainty of consequence.
When the frequency of a loss is uncertain, insurers are unlikely to
insure it or will undertake to do so only for a very high premium.
For example, the frequency of auto accidents is predictable across
large pools, so this is a risk that is relatively easy to insure. 8 There
is enough of an historical record with regard to the frequency of
tornadoes and windstorms in different regions of the United States
that insurers can go into a market with some confidence about the
range of likely losses over a finite period of time.29 Although the
weight of scientific authority suggests that hurricane frequency is
undergoing a shift that will distinguish the next few from the past
few decades, the accumulated historical record on hurricane and
earthquake frequency gives some basis for predictions of future
events.30 Terrorism stands in contrast to these examples; because
the timing of a terrorist incident is controlled by human forces, the
frequency with which such events will occur is uncertain, and this
makes the risk difficult to manage.
Uncertainty of consequence is a related kind of ambiguity. The
massive losses suffered on 9/11 made insurers reluctant to cover the
risk of terrorism, in stark contrast to pre-9/11 markets when
insurers were not particularly concerned about terrorism losses,
notwithstanding Oklahoma City and the attack on the World Trade
28. Graciela Chichilnisky, Catastrophic Risks: The Need for New Tools,
Financial Instruments and Institutions, Oct. 20, 2005, http://privatizationofrisk.
ssrc.org/Chichilnisky/.
29. See, e.g., Statement of Michael G. McCarter, Chairperson of Terrorism
Risk Insurance Subgroup of the American Academy of Actuaries, to Terrorism
Insurance Implementation Working Group of National Association of
Insurance Commissioners, Mar. 29, 2006, http://www.naic.org/documents/
topics-tria testimony0603_AAA.pdf ("[In evaluating tornado risk, we have an
historical database consisting of thousands of observations of tornados .. ").
30. See, e.g., KLOTZBACH & GRAY, supra note 5, at 6-7. See also NewsHour
with Jim Lehrer: Predicting Earthquakes (PBS television broadcast June 2,
2004) (transcript on file with the Wake Forest Law Review).
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Center in 1993. 3' The losses of 9/11 have caused insurers to
recalculate the upper bounds of potential terrorism losses, and the
potential consequences of nuclear, biological, and chemical terrorist
attacks have pushed the upper bound of theoretical losses very high.
The wide range of potential consequence, which, like frequency,
depends on human behavior and is therefore inherently difficult to
predict, makes terrorism a very difficult risk to manage.
A third characteristic of a difficult risk is lack of demand for
coverage. This has at least three facets. First, as noted economist
Howard Kunreuther argues persuasively, very few people
voluntarily protect themselves against a hazard unless they have
past experience with it or know someone else who has endured it.
32
Second, budget constraints limit demand for insurance, especially
when consumers do not have a claim, or know anyone who has a
claim, for a sustained period of time. For many persons, having no
claim against the policy is understood as purchasing a product with
little value, notwithstanding that the person received security
against loss during the time the policy was in force.33 Third, an
expectation of ex post government disaster assistance may reduce
the demand for coverage-or it may not. Economists disagree about
whether a perception that government will come to the aid of
disaster victims after the event causes individuals not to buy
insurance before a disaster.34 There is some empirical authority that
it does not,35 but this is a question that needs more study, especially
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Terrorism and natural disasters are both examples of difficult
risks, and these two perils receive more attention in the next two
subsections.
B. Terrorism
Notwithstanding the nonoccurrence of a major terrorism event
on United States soil in nearly five years, terrorism remains a major
domestic concern. The reality is that terrorists continue to be a
potent force, committed to striking at a time and place of their
31. See Insurance Information Institute, Terrorism Risk and Insurance,
May 2006, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/xxx (noting that prior to
9/11, insurers provided terrorism coverage essentially for free because the
chance of a terrorist event was deemed to be remote, but insurers reassessed
the risk after 9/11 and coverage became scarce).
32. Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural
Disaster Insurance?, in ON RiSK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE
KATRINA 178 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006).
33. Id. at 179-80.
34. Id. at 183.
35. Id.
2006
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choosing. Since 9/11, terrorist attacks around the world have
continued, and even accelerated.36 In the second half of 2005,
terrorists delivered deadly strikes in London in July,37 in Bali in
October,38 and in Amman in November.39 Despite attempts to kill or
capture them, Osama bin Laden and his top lieutenant, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, remain at large, continuing to record messages
threatening the West and inspiring their followers.40
Al Qaeda is no longer the command-and-control organization it
was prior to the 9/11 attacks, but it has successfully evolved into
both a network 41 and an idea.42 Receiving inspiration from a
36. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2004 3 (2005)
("Terrorism remains a global threat from which no nation is immune. Despite
ongoing improvements in US homeland security, military campaigns against
insurgents and terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan, and deepening
counterterrorism cooperation among the nations of the world, international
terrorism continued to pose a significant threat to the United States and its
partners in 2004.").
37. Alan Cowell, Subway and Bus Blasts in London Kill at Least 37, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2005, at Al.
38. Ellen Nakashima & Alan Sipress, 25 Killed in Three Blasts in Bali,
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2005, at Al.
39. Hassan M. Fattah & Michael Slackman, 3 Hotels Bombed in Jordan; At
Least 57 Die, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at Al.
40. On January 19, 2006, bin Laden released a taped audio message
threatening future attacks. It was bin Laden's first communiqu6 in more than
one year. See Hassan M. Fattah, Bin Laden Warns of Attacks in U.S. But Offers
Truce, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2006, at Al. On January 30, 2006, al Qaeda's
second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released a videotaped message
taunting the United States for its failed Jan. 13, 2006, attempt to assassinate
al-Zawahiri in the remote Pakistan village of Damadola. See Nadia Abou El-
Magd, Al Qaeda Deputy Taunts Bush, Calling Him 'Failure' in New Tape, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 31, 2006, at C7. On April 23, 2006, another bin Laden audiotape
aired. See Craig Whitlock, On Tape, Bin Laden Warns of Long War; He Accuses
the West of Acting as 'Crusader', WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2006, at Al. Just days
later, on April 26, a videotaped message from al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, surfaced. Unlike bin Laden, who has used videotape in the
past, the al-Zarqawi videotape was his first. See Dexter Filkins, Qaeda Video
Vows Iraq Defeat for 'Crusader' U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2006, at Al. A short
time later, in June 2006, an American airstrike killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
See John F. Burns, After Long Hunt, U.S. Bombs Kill Al Qaeda Leader in Iraq,
N. Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at Al. After al-Zarqawi's death, Bin Laden praised
al-Zarqawi in yet another audiotape. See Karen DeYoung, Bin Laden Tape
Calls Zarqawi 'Brave Knight', WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, at A6.
41. Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States:
Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. 46 (2005)
(statement of Lowell E. Jacoby, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency) ("Usama
bin Ladin and his senior leadership no longer exercise centralized control and
direction. We now face an 'al-Qaida associated movement' of like-minded
groups who interact, share resources and work to achieve shared goals. Some of
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common jihadist ideology, those who consider themselves part of al
Qaeda span the globe.43 The flurry of terrorism indictments and
successful prosecutions suggest that the intent to strike has not
abated.44  The August 2006 revelation that British authorities
disrupted an alleged plot to destroy commercial airliners over the
Atlantic is a stark reminder that terrorists remain active,
persistent, and committed.45  Successfully foiled plots suggest that
intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security capabilities
continue to improve. Despite successes, intercepting terrorists
before they strike is a challenge of the highest order: the time, place,
and manner of a plot often elude detection until after the fact.46
the groups comprising this movement include Jemaah Islamiyya ... and Hezb-
e-Islami-Gulbuddin. Some of the groups in the movement provide safe haven
and logistical support to al-Qaida members, others operate directly with al-
Qaida and still others fight with al-Qaida in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region.").
42. NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL'S 2020 PROJECT, MAPPING THE GLOBAL
FUTURE 17 (2004), http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf ("Counterterrorism
efforts in the years ahead-against a more diverse set of terrorists who are
connected more by ideology than by geography-will be a more elusive
challenge than focusing on a centralized organization such as al-Qa'ida.").
43. See generally Simon Elegant et al., On Terror's Trail; The Bali Suicide
Bombings Show that Asian Terror Networks Have Become More Loosely
Organized-and Harder to Combat, TIME INT'L, Oct. 17, 2005, at 16 (describing
South Asian terrorist groups and their operations, particularly in Indonesia).
44. In October 2003, lyman Faris was accused of-and later pleaded guilty
to-federal terrorism charges for his role in a plot to attack a New York City
bridge, among other targets. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Iyman Faris
Sentenced for Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda (Oct. 28, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/October/03_crm_589.htm. More recently, in
August 2005, the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California announced
indictments against four men "for their alleged roles in a terrorist plot to attack
U.S. military facilities, Israeli government facilities, and Jewish synagogues in
the Los Angeles area . . . ." Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Four Men
Indicted on Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy to Attack Military
Facilities, Other Targets (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/
August/05_crm_453.htm. On February 9, 2006, President Bush offered a rather
detailed revelation that law enforcement and homeland security authorities had
intercepted a plot to hijack an airplane and fly it into the US Bank tower in Los
Angeles in 2002. See Peter Wallsten & Josh Meyer, Bush Gives New Details
About Old Report of L.A. Terror Plot, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2006, at Al. But see
Peter Baker & Dan Eggen, Bush Details 2002 Plot to Attack L.A. Tower, WASH.
POST, Feb. 10, 2006, at A4 (suggesting that President Bush offered details of the
plot, first made public in October 2005, to mitigate criticism regarding the
Administration's domestic spying controversy).
45. See Alan Cowell and Dexter Filkins, Terror Plot Foiled; Airports
Quickly Clamp Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006, at Al.
46. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, TERRORISM, ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, AND
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 8 (2002) ("There are no clear boundaries that
separate one form of [terrorist] attack from another or that allow the U.S.
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Terrorism is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, largely
• 41
unpredictable.
Yet the unpredictable nature of terrorism does not mean that
terrorism is unforeseeable. Although the particulars are conjecture,
future attacks are a matter of when, not if.48 In negligence actions
brought by terrorism victims or their families, courts have accepted
the premise that a terrorist attack is a reasonably foreseeable event.
Following the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993,49 victims
and their families sued the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey for negligent security practices.0  The Port Authority
asserted that it was not liable "because the bombing was not
foreseeable as a matter of law."5' Citing pre-1993 terror studies
conducted at the direction of the Port Authority that analyzed the
threats to and the vulnerabilities of the World Trade Center, 2 the
court rejected the argument that the bombing was not foreseeable, 3
government to predict where and how it will have to defend itself against an
attack or to strike first to prevent one from happening. While it is tempting for
governments to plan for the kind of near simultaneous hijacking of four aircraft
... there is no reason to assume than an attacker must follow such rules.").
47. Id.
48. See NAT'L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL'S 2020 PROJECT, supra note 42, at 18.
49. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST Ai'IACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 71 (2004) ("At 18 minutes after noon on February 26,
1993, a huge bomb went off beneath the two towers of the World Trade Center.
This was not a suicide attack. The terrorists parked a truck bomb with a
timing device on Level B-2 of the underground garage, then departed. The
ensuing explosion opened a hole seven stories up. Six people died. More than a
thousand were injured.").
50. In re World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 776 N.Y.S.2d 713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2004) (granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for summary
judgment), affd, 784 N.Y.S.2d 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). The plaintiffs
specifically alleged, among other things,
that the Port Authority was negligent with respect to security: in
failing to adopt, implement, and follow the recommendations in the
security reports; in failing to restrict public access to the parking
levels; in failing to have an adequate security plan; in failing to
provide an electronic security system; in failing to institute a manned
checkpoint at the garage; in failing to subject vehicles to inspection
and to have security signs; in failing to have adequate security
personnel; in failing to employ recording devices concerning vehicles,
operators, occupants, and pedestrians; and in failing to conduct
studies of the possible results of a bombing of the complex.
Id. at 723.
51. Id. at 724.
52. In response to the rise of terrorist activity in the 1980s, the Port
Authority established a "Terrorist Planning and Intelligence Section" to identify
"terrorist groups and Port Authority targets, and to assess the vulnerability of
Port Authority facilities to terrorist attack." Id. at 718.
53. Id. at 736.
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noting that "[t]he Port Authority's claim that [the 1993 bombing]
was unforeseeable as a matter of law strains credulity." 4 Following
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some family members of victims who
perished filed a similar lawsuit against the parties they believed
were civilly liable for the attack.55 In addition to claims against the
Port Authority and the World Trade Center leaseholder,56 the
plaintiffs sought recovery from the airplane manufacturer, Boeing
Corporation. Plaintiffs claimed that Boeing knew, or should have
known, that terrorists considered commercial airliners attractive
targets and that a failure to design a stronger cockpit door breached
Boeing's duty of care to passengers.58 The judge, in sustaining the
plaintiffs argument, found that:
There have been many efforts by terrorists to hijack airplanes,
and too many have been successful. The practice of terrorists
to blow themselves up in order to kill as many people as
possible has also been prevalent. Although there have been no
incidents before the ones of September 11, 2001 where
terrorists combined both an airplane hijacking and a suicidal
explosion, I am not able to say that the risk of crashes was not
54. Id. In October 2005, a jury found the Port Authority negligent for
inadequate security practices in connection with the 1993 bombing. Jury Rules
Agency was Negligent in 1993 Attack, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2005, at A10. The
jury deemed the Port Authority to be "68 percent at fault for the bombing while
the terrorists who carried it out were 32 percent at fault." Anemona
Hartocollis, Port Authority Found Negligent in 1993 Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
27, 2005, at Al.
55. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Pursuant to
Congressional mandate, all civil actions were consolidated and brought before
the federal court for the Southern District of New York. See also discussion of
the Victim Compensation Fund, infra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
56. Plaintiffs asserted that the Port Authority and World Trade Center
Properties, LLC,
1) failed to design and construct the World Trade Center buildings
according to safe engineering practices and to provide for safe escape
routes and adequate sprinkler systems and fireproofing; 2) failed to
inspect, discover, and repair unsafe and dangerous conditions, and to
maintain fireproofing materials; 3) failed to develop adequate and safe
evacuation and emergency management plans; 4) failed to apply,
interpret and/or enforce applicable building and fire safety codes,
regulations and practices; and 5) instructed Tower Two occupants to
return to their offices and remain in the building even while the upper
floors of Tower One were being consumed by uncontrolled fires
following the airplane crash into Tower One.
In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 298-99.
57. Id. at 305.
58. Id. at 306. After 9/11, federal law directed the Federal Aviation
Administration to order the "strengthening" of all cockpit doors to prevent entry
by unauthorized individuals. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-71 § 104(a), 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
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reasonably foreseeable to an airplane manufacturer. 9
Thus, the existence of a legal duty devolving from the
foreseeable nature of a terrorist attack is now beyond dispute. 60 The
public availability of information related to terrorist activity places
would-be defendants on notice: although the when and where of a
future strike cannot be known, the foreseeability of harm is now
squarely acknowledged.'
Notwithstanding the unprecedented damage caused by the
terrorist strikes on 9/11, the destruction which occurred in those
attacks would be greatly exceeded if any one of a number of
foreseeable scenarios were to escape our nation's ongoing efforts to
disrupt and prevent their occurrence. Currently, the greatest threat
to U.S. domestic security is a terrorist armed with a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon (commonly described as a
"CBRN weapon"). 62 A CBRN attack could result in untold casualties
and billions of dollars in direct and indirect economic losses.63 The
59. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
60. See generally Joe Wientge, Comment, Foreseeable Change: The Need for
Modification of the Foreseeability Standard in Cases Resulting From Terrorist
Acts After September 11th, 74 UMKC L. REV. 165 (2005). The author concludes,
in part, that "[tihe establishment of terrorist attacks as henceforth foreseeable
will provide an incentive for negligent actors to create adequate security
measures." Id. at 196.
61. Litigation has even been attempted in the absence of harm. In 2004, a
tenant of the Empire State Building sued the operators of the building alleging
inadequate security practices. See Susan Saulny, Suit Seeks Tighter Security at
the Empire State Building, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2004, at B2 ("[T]he plaintiffs
cite reports that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda have conducted surveillance in
the city and desire to attack symbolic buildings. The Empire State Building,
the suit states, would be a prime target.").
62. Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong. Sess. 2 (2006)
(statement of John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence) ("Although
an attack using conventional explosives continues to be the most probable
scenario, al-Qa'ida remains interested in acquiring chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons to attack the United States, US
troops, and US interests worldwide."). See also COMM'N ON THE INTELLIGENCE
CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 501-36 (2005) (describing the
threats of biological, nuclear, and chemical weapons and governmental reforms
necessary to address them).
63. See generally DAVID HOWE, HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, PLANNING
SCENARIOS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES CREATED FOR USE IN NATIONAL, FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL HOMELAND SECURITY PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES (2004)
(describing eleven CBRN scenarios and their human and economic costs). A
study by the American Academy of Actuaries of damage from a range of
terrorism acts in four cities indicated that losses would be in the hundreds of
billions of dollars. A CBRN event in New York City, for example, could cost as
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worst-case scenario is the detonation of an improvised nuclear
weapon, and the magnitude of the ensuing losses would cripple the
64global economy.
The prospect of the detonation of a chemical weapon is also a
worrisome scenario. History is instructive: on December 3, 1984,
near Bhopal, India, highly toxic methyl isocyanate escaped from a
chemical plant operated by Union Carbide India Ltd. 65 The toxic
cloud killed approximately 3800 people and maimed thousands
more.6 6 Largely in response to the Bhopal tragedy, Congress passed
legislation to reduce the possibility that a similar disaster could
occur in the United States, 67 but the prospect that terrorists might
attempt to recreate Bhopal has not been lost on homeland security
officials and lawmakers. 8 In fact, the vulnerability of chemical
facilities to terrorist attack has been well documented. In April
2005, the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") found that
"[s]ome [chemical] facilities may be at higher risk of a terrorist
attack than others because of the specific chemicals on site and their
proximity to population centers."6'9 The GAO then cited data from
much as $778.1 billion. Insurance Information Institute, supra note 31.
64. See HowE, supra note 63, at 1-1 to 1-5.
65. Union Carbide Corp., Chronology, http://www.bhopal.com/pdfs/
chrono05.pdf (last visited June 21, 2006).
66. Id. Within days of the tragedy, victims began to file lawsuits in U.S.
federal court. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal,
India in Dec. 1984, 809 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1987).
67. See Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50 (2000) (requiring emergency planning, notification, and
response as it relates to hazardous chemicals). See also Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 112, 104 Stat. 2399, 2570 (1990)
("In order to prevent accidental releases of regulated [hazardous] substances,
the Administrator [of the Environmental Protection Agency] is authorized to
promulgate release prevention, detection, and correction requirements which
may include monitoring, record-keeping, reporting, training, vapor recovery,
secondary containment, and other design, equipment, work practice, and
operational requirements."). See also Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal:
"Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risk Index Taxes, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 762
(1992) (asserting that additional steps are necessary to prevent such a disaster,
including the use of economic incentives and restrictive zoning).
68. The Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee of the U.S.
Senate held extensive hearings on the subject in 2005. See Press Release,
Senate Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs Comm., Senator Collins Chairs
Hearing to Examine Security of Chemical Facilities, Vulnerability to Terrorist
Attacks (Apr. 27, 2005).
69. Homeland Security: Federal and Industry Efforts Are Addressing
Security Issues at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Action is Needed: Before
the U.S. S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of John B. Stephenson, Director, GAO Natural
Resources and Environment).
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the Environmental Protection Agency that found that "123 U.S.
chemical facilities had 'worst-case' scenarios where more than one
million people could be at risk of exposure to a cloud of toxic gas" as
a result of a terrorist attack.0 Congress continues to examine the
utility of federal chemical facility security legislation and appears
poised to pass a bipartisan measure sometime in the near future.7'
Some lawmakers have been unwilling to wait for federal action
to safeguard hazardous chemicals. Noting the magnitude of the
foreseeable harm and the perceived inaction on the part of the
federal government, the Council of the District of Columbia passed
the Terrorism Prevention in Hazardous Materials Transportation
Emergency Act of 2005.72 The Act bans the movement of certain
classes of hazardous cargo among the roads and rail-lines that pass
within 2.2 miles of the U.S. Capitol complex.73 While the ban
prompted a legal showdown between District officials and railroad
operator CSX Transportation, Inc., which claimed the ban violated
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and was preempted by
federal law,74 the debate underscores an issue upon which both sides
can agree. A railcar loaded with ultra-hazardous material is similar
to a warhead loaded with a chemical agent; 75 a coordinated terrorist
strike against such cargo is a foreseeable danger that could cause
catastrophic human and economic losses. 6
70. Id.
71. See Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2005, S. 2145, 109th Cong.
72. Terrorism Prevention in Hazardous Materials Transportation
Emergency Act of 2005, D.C. Act 16-43 (Feb. 15, 2005) (current version at D.C.
Code Ann. § 8-1421 (LexisNexis 2006)) amended by Terrorism Prevention in
Hazardous Materials Transportation Emergency Act of 2006 D.C. Act 16-266
(April 4, 2006).
73. D.C. Code Ann. § 8-1421(5) (LexisNexis 2006); see also Eric M. Weiss &
Spencer S. Hsu, 90-Day Hazmat Ban Is Passed: Measure Will Bar Shipments in
D.C., WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2005 at B1.
74. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667, 669-70 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
75. The material transported by some railcars has the potential to kill and
injure if inhaled, absorbed, or contacted. Recent rail accidents highlight the
danger. In January 2005, a train carrying chlorine gas collided with a parked
train in Graniteville, South Carolina. The resulting release of chlorine gas
killed nine, injured scores more, and caused the evacuation of more than 5,000
people within a one-mile radius of the accident site. See NAT'L TRANsP. SAFETY
BD., RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT, COLLISION OF NORFOLK SOUTHERN FREIGHT
TRAIN 192 WITH STANDING NORFOLK SOUTHERN LOcAL TRAIN P22 WITH
SUBSEQUENT HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE AT GRANITEVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA
JANUARY 6,2005 1 (2005).
76. See D.C. Code Ann. § 8-1421(1) (LexisNexis 2006) ("A terrorist attack
on a large-quantity hazardous material shipment near the United States
Capitol . . . would be expected to cause tens of thousands of deaths and a
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C. Natural Disasters
The risk of catastrophic loss due to natural forces is hardly a
new feature on the global landscape. The sudden eruption of Mt.
Vesuvius on August 24, 79 C.E., buried two cities so thoroughly in
only a few hours that the ruins were not uncovered for nearly 1,70077
years. The 1902 eruption of Mt. Pelee on the Caribbean island of
Martinique destroyed the town of St. Pierre, killing more than
30,000 people in the process. 8  On September 1, 1923,
approximately 140,000 people were killed in Tokyo and Yokohama
in a devastating, destructive earthquake. 9 In recent memory is the
December 2004 East Asian tsunami, which killed approximately
200,000 people on two continents and changed the map of some
coastal nations.80 As the world focused on the devastation wrought
by the December 2004 tsunami, relatively few noticed that NASA's
Near Earth Object Program had recalculated the path of Asteroid
2004 MN4 and forecast a one in thirty-seven chance that the
asteroid would strike the earth on April 13, 2029, with potentially
serious consequences.81 Fortunately, another more refined set of
calculations would later confirm that this asteroid will miss the
earth by about 22,000 miles (less than one-tenth of the moon's orbit
around the earth), 2 but the prospect of an asteroid striking earth
catastrophic economic impact of $5 billion or more."). It is important to note
that the number of victims will depend on a host of factors, which include wind
speed and direction, time of day, the specific characteristics of the agent, the
speed and skill of emergency responders to triage and decontaminate victims,
and the surge capacity at local hospitals.
77. ERNESTO DE CAROLIS & GIOVANNI PATRICELLI, VESUvIUS, A.D. 79: THE
DESTRUCTION OF POMPEII AND HERCULANEUM 7 (2003).
78. DAVID RITCHIE, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTHQUAKES AND VOLCANOES
125 (1994).
79. Id. at 85.
80. See Seth Mydans, Where Tsunami Ravaged, Barely a Sign of Relief,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A2.
81. See Robert Roy Britt, Whew! Asteroid Won't Hit Earth in 2029,
Scientists Now Say, SPACE.COM Dec. 27, 2004, http://www.space.com/
scienceastronomy/asteroid-update B 041227.html. On December 23, 2004,
calculations put the odds of impact of Asteroid 2004 MN4 with Earth at 1-in-
300, but on Dec. 27, 2004, those odds went to 1-in-37, which gave this asteroid
the highest warning level ever (four out of ten on the Torino Scale). However,
scientists quickly recalculated the odds using new data and ruled out the
possibility that the asteroid would strike Earth. Id.
82. See Press Release, NASA Near Earth Object Program, Radar
Observations Refine the Future Motion of Asteroid 2004 MN4 (Feb. 3, 2005)
http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/news/news149.html. The latest calculations have the
asteroid passing within 22,600 miles of earth-or less than one-tenth of the
moon's distance from the Earth and below the orbit of some satellites now in
orbit around Earth. The asteroid will be visible to the naked eye as it passes,
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with devastating results is not science-fiction fantasy.
Although the risk of catastrophic loss in the United States
received casual treatment for many years, the risk is better
appreciated today. The four hurricanes that struck Florida in 2004
with devastating consequences were, in hindsight, a mild prelude for
the destruction caused in New Orleans and along the Mississippi-
Alabama coastline by Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. More
than sixty years of volcanic inactivity in the United States ended in
1980 with the eruption of Mount St. Helens. Because this eruption
occurred in a remote area of Oregon, loss of life and property
damage were limited, but the eruption served to remind inhabitants
of the northwest that seven times in the last 6,000 years debris
flows from Mount Rainier have reached the Puget Sound, and about
100,000 people now live in areas that have been covered by these
debris flows.8 3 An earthquake of 9.0 or greater somewhere between
northern California and Canada is inevitable,84 as is a high-
magnitude earthquake in the Midwest along the New Madrid fault,
which runs on the west side of the Mississippi River in the Missouri
boot heel.88  All U.S. coastal areas are vulnerable to devastating
tsunamis, 6 and the potential for a hurricane stronger than Katrina
to hit New York City or Miami is real.87 The Yellowstone area in
Wyoming is actually the site of an ancient super-volcano, which
erupts on the average of once every 600,000 years, dumping about
and the encounter will be so close that the asteroid's future orbit around the
sun will be altered. Id.
83. U.S. Geological Survey, Living With A Volcano In Your Backyard:
Volcanic Hazards at Mount Rainier, http://vulcan.wr.usgs.gov/Outreach/
Publications/GIP19/chapter three volcano in backyard.pdf (last visited Aug.
31, 2006).
84. See Robin Lloyd, Tsunami-Generating Earthquake Near U.S.
Possibly Imminent, LIVESCIENCE, Jan. 3, 2005, http://www.livescience.com/
forcesofnature/050103_cascadia tsunami.html.
85. See Robert Roy Britt, Central U.S. Warned of Larger Earthquakes to
Come, LIvESCIENCE, Feb. 10, 2005, http://www.livescience.con/forcesofnature/
050210_earthquake-arkansas.html.
86. See Tariq Malik, Catch the Wave: Asteroid-driven Tsunami in U.S.
Eastern Seaboard's Future, LWVESCIENCE, June 2, 2003, http://www.space.com/
scienceastronomy/tsunami asteroid_030602.html. See also LiveScience staff,
Potential Southern California Tsunami Could Cost up to $42
Billion, LIvESCIENCE, Mar. 31, 2005, http://www.livescience.com/forcesofnature/
050331_tsunami california.html; Michael Schirber, New Warning: U.S. Gulf
Coast Faces High Tsunami Risk, LIVESCIENCE, March 16, 2005,
http://www.livescience.com/forcesofnature/050316-tsunami_carib.html.
87. See Robert Roy Britt, History Reveals Hurricane Threat to New York
City, LIVESCIENCE, June 1, 2005, http://www.livescience.com/forcesofnature/
05060 1_hurricane_1938.html.
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three feet of ash on a third of the continental United States."' There
are no indications that another eruption is imminent, and one hopes
that the next eruption is tens of thousands of years from now, but
the last super-eruption occurred 620,000 years ago, which means
that the next eruption, based on the averages, is overdue.89
The frequency of earthquakes, volcanic activity, and tsunamis is
static, but some scientists contend that changing climate conditions
related to global warming are increasing both the frequency and
strength of hurricane activity. 90 Yet, the most significant factor
driving up the consequences of these events is the unprecedented
growth in the exposure to them. Coastal development, increased
aggregation of property in urban centers, and the increasing costs of
constructing residential and commercial property have all greatly
increased the amount of potential loss from these events.9' Without
question, the prospect of increasingly damaging natural disasters is
a dominant feature of the risk-management landscape.
D. The Multi-Jurisdictional Character of Terrorism and Natural
Disaster Events
It is self-evident that when large terrorism events and natural
disasters occur, the consequences reach well beyond the borders of
any single jurisdiction. For example, if a terrorist event involving
CBRN weapons were to occur, under all foreseeable scenarios the
response would be multi-jurisdictional. State and local authorities
would be the first to respond and would take crucial initial steps to
care for the injured, secure the scene of the attack, and begin
remediation.9' Because terrorist acts violate federal law, the Federal
88. See Robert Roy Britt, Super Volcano Will Challenge Civilization,
Geologists Warn, LIVESCIENCE, Mar. 8, 2005, http://www.livescience.com/
forcesofnature/050308_supervolcano.html.
89. Id.
90. See Brian Ross, More Scientists Say Global Warning Causes Stronger
Hurricanes, ABC NEWS, Sept. 23, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/2020/
HurricaneRita/story?id=1154125.
91. Roger A. Pielke, Jr. & Christopher W. Landsea, Normalized Hurricane
Damages in the United States: 1925-95, 13 WEATHER AND FORECASTING 621, 623
(1998).
92. A 2005 Report by the Government Accountability Office described the
full breadth of first responder responsibilities during an emergency:
Traditionally, first responders have been trained and equipped, in the
event of an emergency-natural or accidental disasters and terrorist
attacks-to arrive on the scene and take action immediately. In the
first hours of an event, first responders from various disciplines ...
must attempt to enter the scene, set up a command center, establish a
safe and secure perimeter around the site in order to save lives and
protect property, evacuate those within or near the site, tend to the
injured and dead and transport them to care centers or morgues,
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Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") would assume primary
responsibility for the criminal investigation supported by other
federal departments, including the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS").93  The seriousness of the emergency-and the
limits of first responders to manage a large-scale chemical attack-
would invariably cause the governor of the affected state to seek
assistance from the federal government, most likely through the
disaster declaration provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.94 In most circumstances, the
Stafford Act applies only after a Governor's declaration to the
President of a "major disaster"95 or "emergency."96  In either
restrict and redirect traffic and pedestrians, reroute and restore public
utilities, remove debris, and begin the process of recovery.
U.S. GOV'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-652, HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS'
EFFORTS TO ENHANCE FIRST RESPONDERS' ALL-HAZARDS CAPABILITIES CONTINUE
TO EVOLVE 7-8 (2005).
93. 28 C.F.R § 0.85(1) (2005) ("The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation shall... [e]xercise Lead Agency responsibility in investigating all
crimes for which it has primary or concurrent jurisdiction and which involve
terrorist activities or acts in preparation of terrorist activities within the
statutory jurisdiction of the United States. Within the United States, this
would include the collection, coordination, analysis, management and
dissemination of intelligence and criminal information as appropriate. If
another Federal agency identifies an individual who is engaged in terrorist
activities or in acts in preparation of terrorist activities, that agency is
requested to promptly notify the FBI. Terrorism includes the unlawful use of
force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of
political or social objectives.").
94. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5191-
5206 (2000)). For an excellent overview of the Stafford Act, see KEITH BEA,
CONG. RES. SERV., FEDERAL STAFFORD ACT DISASTER ASSISTANCE: PRESIDENTIAL
DECLARATIONS, ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES, AND FUNDING (2005). See also Jim
Winthrop, The Oklahoma City Bombing: Immediate Response Authority and
Other Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA), ARMY LAW., July 1997, at
3 (discussing the DOD response to the Oklahoma City Bombing under the
Stafford Act).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2000) ("All requests for a declaration by the President
that a major disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected
State."). The Act defines a major disaster as "any natural catastrophe
(including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal
wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm,
or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of
the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage
of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under
this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local
governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss,
hardship, or suffering caused thereby." Id. § 5122(2).
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instance, the governor must first find that the event is of "such
severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the
capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that
Federal assistance is necessary."97 Following such a request, the Act
empowers the President to declare that a major disaster or
emergency indeed exists and liberally provide federal resources.98
A unique provision of the Stafford Act permits the President to
bypass a gubernatorial request for federal assistance when "an
emergency exists for which the primary responsibility for response
rests with the United States because the emergency involves a
subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent
responsibility and authority."99 This is precisely what occurred
following the terrorist bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995. Less than
one hour after the blast, Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating
declared a state of emergency directing state resources to Oklahoma
City.100  Because the Murrah Building was a federal facility,
however, the President had the authority to issue a federal
emergency declaration independently. 101 Using this authority,
President Clinton issued a federal emergency declaration directing
federal resources and money to Oklahoma City that same day."2
The Stafford Act and its application underscore two important
tenets of emergency management. First, major disasters-whether
natural or man-made, intentional, or accidental-require significant
federal involvement for response and recovery. The Stafford Act's
Congressional findings and declarations recognize this reality:
[B]ecause disasters often disrupt the normal functioning of
governments and communities, and adversely affect
96. Id. § 5191(a) ("All requests for a declaration by the President that an
emergency exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State."). The
Act defines an emergency as "any occasion or instance for which, in the
determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement
State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and
public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any
part of the United States." Id. § 5122(1).
97. Id. §§ 5170, 5191(a).
98. Id. §§ 5170, 5170(a), 5191-92.
99. Id. § 5191(b).
100. THE OKLAHOMA DEP'T OF CIVIL EMERGENCY MGMT., AFTER ACTION
REPORT ALFRED P. MURRAH FEDERAL BUILDING BOMBING 19 APRIL 1995 IN
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA, Exhibit C.
101. See Winthrop, supra note 94, at 10.
102. Oklahoma; Emergency and Related Determinations, 60 Fed. Reg.
22,579 (Apr. 19, 1995).
2006
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
individuals and families with great severity[,] special
measures, designed to assist the efforts of the affected States
in expediting the rendering of aid, assistance, and emergency
services, and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of
devastated areas, are necessary.103
Second, embedded in the Stafford Act are principles of federalism
and dual sovereignty. With rare exception, the management of a
disaster is reserved to the affected state, unless and until the state
actively seeks federal assistance.1 0 4 Nonetheless, states frequently
seek federal assistance, and the Stafford Act continues to be used
widely. In other words, the Stafford Act is state-centric in form,
but its practical effect is to strengthen federal involvement following
emergencies.
From all appearances, the involvement of the federal
government in disaster response has increased further since 9/11.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 ("HSPD-5") establishes
a national strategy for emergency management. 10 6  HSPD-5
recognizes the sovereignty of state and local governments to manage
disasters, and the presumptively limited federal role' the directive
provides.
The Federal Government recognizes the roles and
responsibilities of State and local authorities in domestic
incident management. Initial responsibility for managing
domestic incidents generally falls on State and local
authorities. The Federal Government will assist State and
local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or
when Federal interests are involved.
0 8
The directive then authorizes a greater federal role by establishing
that "[t]he Secretary [of DHS] will coordinate with State and local
governments to ensure adequate planning, equipment, training, and
103. 42 U.S.C. § 5121(a) (2000).
104. Id. §§ 5170, 5191(b).
105. See BEA, supra note 94, at 1 ("In calendar year 2004, President Bush
issued 68 major disaster declarations .... ).
106. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, The White House § 3 (Feb.
28, 2003) ("To prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist
attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, the United States Government
shall establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident
management. The objective of the United States Government is to ensure that
all levels of government across the Nation have the capability to work
efficiently and effectively together, using a national approach to domestic
incident management.").
107. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 15 (2004) ("A
basic premise of the NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest
jurisdictional level possible.").
108. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, supra note 106, § 6.
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exercise activities."10 9
The National Response Plan ("NRP") effectuates this directive
and other policies required by HSPD-5." Released by the DHS in
December 2004, the NRP seeks "to align Federal coordination
structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline,
and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management" which
will result in "vastly improved coordination among Federal, State,
local, and tribal organizations to help save lives and protect
America's communities by increasing the speed, effectiveness, and
efficiency of incident management."
Whatever might be said about the structure for disaster
response under the NRP, Hurricane Katrina exposed substantial
deficiencies in the implementation of the federal response. What
was obvious to the general public through real-time media coverage
of the disaster response was underscored by the Final Report of the
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina: "Hurricane Katrina exposed
numerous deficiencies in the existing national framework for
emergency management, including specific mistakes that delayed an
appropriate federal response. Confusion accompanied the
implementation of the NRP, resulting in key elements of the plan
executed late, ineffectively, or not at all."
1 2
Hurricane Katrina also exposed confusion regarding the NRP's
relationship to the Stafford Act, and vice versa.11 3 While the Stafford
Act vests authority with the President to make a disaster
declaration, typically after a request from a state governor,1 the
NRP vests authority to declare an "Incident of National
Significance" 5 with the Secretary of Homeland Security.1 6  On
109. Id.
110. See id. § 16.
111. NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 107, at i.
112. A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE
KATRINA, H.R. REP. 109-377, at 146 (2006) [hereinafter KATRINA REPORT].
113. Id. at 203 ("Some point out that in cases of a major catastrophe, the
President through the Stafford Act can designate and deploy federal resources
without following NRP procedures.").
114. 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (2000).
115. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 107, at 67 (defining an
Incident of National Significance as "an actual or potential high-impact event
that requires a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate
combination of Federal, State, local, tribal, or nongovernmental, and/or private-
sector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage, and provide the
basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities").
116. Id. at 49 ("For actual or potential Incidents of National Significance, the
[Homeland Security Operations Center] reports the situation to the Secretary of
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August 29, the day the levees in New Orleans failed, President Bush
issued a major disaster declaration under the Stafford Act for
affected areas of Louisiana.117 On August 30, DHS Secretary
Michael Chertoff declared Hurricane Katrina an Incident of
National Significance, thereby triggering the NRP."18 Because every
emergency declaration under the Stafford Act is, by definition, an
Incident of National Significance, "the declaration [of an Incident of
National Significance] was meaningless, because, by the plain terms
of the National Response Plan, Hurricane Katrina had become an
'Incident of National Significance' three days earlier [sic] 119 when the
President declared an emergency [under the Stafford Act] in
Louisiana.", 20 There can be little doubt that "[t]he lack of awareness
of this fundamental tenet of the National Response Plan ... helps
explain the [Homeland Security] Department's slow, sometimes
hesitant response to the storm."
12
The mismanagement in the wake of Hurricane Katrina has
already compelled a hard review of the nation's management of
emergencies. 22 This review will probably result in the expansion of
federal responsibility to prepare for and respond to the most
significant emergencies, with an emphasis placed on proactive
response to state and local governments. Such a response will
require the federal government "to anticipate state and local
requirements [during an emergency], move commodities and assets
into the area on its own initiative, and shore up or even help
Homeland Security and/or senior staff as delegated by the Secretary, who then
determines the need to activate components of the NRP to conduct further
assessment of the situation, initiate interagency coordination, share
information with affected jurisdictions and the private sector, and/or initiate
deployment of resources. Concurrently, the Secretary of Homeland Security also
makes a determination of whether an event meets the criteria established for a
potential or actual Incident of National significance as defined in this plan.")
(emphasis added).
117. Louisiana; Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg.
53,803 (Aug. 29, 2005).
118. Peter Grier, What We Know So Far-and What We Don't, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Sept. 21, 2005, at 3.
119. The reference should have been "one day earlier," not "three days
earlier."
120. Hurricane Katrina: The Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership: Hearing
before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs).
121. Id.
122. See generally KATRINA REPORT, supra note 112. See also U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-365R, STATEMENT BY COMPTROLLER GENERAL
DAVID M. WALKER ON GAO's PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS REGARDING
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO HuRRIcANEs KATRINA AND RITA 2-3 (2006).
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reconstitute critical state and local emergency management and
response structures."123
E. Ex ante and Ex post Federal Involvement in Disaster Risk
Management
In many respects, government responds to risk in ways that are
analogous to how individuals and firms manage risk. Just as
individuals and firms seek ex ante to reduce the probability of loss
occurring and make efforts ex ante to mitigate the consequences of
loss should it occur, the government has programs that seek ex ante
to reduce the probability of loss and to mitigate the consequences of
loss when it occurs. For example, virtually every aspect of the "war
on terrorism," which is being organized and waged primarily by
agencies at the federal level, is designed to reduce the probability of
a terrorist event occurring. Early-warning systems for chemical and
biological attacks and pre-disaster planning are activities
coordinated predominantly at the federal level and which are
designed to mitigate losses should a terrorist event occur. Early
warning systems for hurricanes and other weather events through
the National Weather Service are ex ante efforts to reduce the
human and economic losses of such events. Land use regulations
and building codes are also ex ante efforts to mitigate natural
disaster loss; most of these programs are functions of state and local
government, although a case can be made that these programs
should be integrated into national policies that are coordinated and
implemented at the federal level as part of a comprehensive national
catastrophe policy.
Ex post disaster relief is also predominantly a federal activity.
The federal role with respect to natural disasters is well-established
and well-known. With respect to terrorism, the most prominent
example, and to date the only significant example, of ex post
disaster relief is the post-9/11 enactment of the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act ("ATSSA"). 124 Congress passed
the ATSSA less than two weeks after 9/11 to protect the airline
industry from the cascading economic consequences of the attacks
and to compensate victims and victims' families for losses suffered.
125
The Victim Compensation Fund established by ATSSA was an
alternative to tort recovery and entitled eligible parties126 to receive
123. KATRINA REPORT, supra note 112, at 132 (emphasis added).
124. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
125. See id. §§ 101, 401.
126. See id. §405(c) (defining criteria for eligibility).
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a one time, tax-free payment funded by the federal government."'
The Attorney General appointed a special master to administer the
fund and make determinations regarding the eligibility of each
claimant and the amount of compensation each claimant would
receive. 128 In authorizing the special master to consider economic
and non-economic losses to determine the award amount,
129
Congress gave this official significant discretion that could not be
disturbed through any form of judicial review. 130  Although
participation in the Victim Compensation Fund was voluntary, a
condition of participation required victims to waive "the right to file
a civil action (or to be a party to a civil action) in any Federal or
State court for damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001." 131 Only a small percentage
of victims elected not to seek relief through the Fund and instead to
bring a civil action under traditional theories of tort law.
132
Although the United States had suffered tragedy at the hands
of terrorists throughout the previous decade, Congress had never
offered a specific compensation mechanism for those injured or
killed prior to 9/11.133 Whether the Victim Compensation Fund
127. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Lecture, 56 ALA. L. REV. 543, 543 (2004) ("The law
simply says that anybody who lost a loved one on 9/11 or anybody that was
physically injured on 9/11 as a result of the 9/11 terrorists attacks is eligible for
federal, tax-free compensation, funded by you, the taxpayer.").
128. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act §§ 404(a), 405.
129. Id. § 405(b). See also Feinberg, supra note 127, at 545-46 (discussing
the difficulty of implementing the statute and determining economic loss).
130. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(3).
131. Id. § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
132. See Feinberg, supra note 127, at 544 ("Some 97% of all eligible families
signed up to enter the fund.").
133. See Larry S. Stewart et al., The September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund: Past or Prologue?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 155 (2002) ("September I1th was
not the first terrorist attack on Americans. There had been others including the
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the
1996 attack on the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, the 1998 bombings
of the United States' embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack on the
USS Cole in 2000. As grievous and as shocking as each was, none prompted
any attempt to enact victim compensation programs. Yet, in just eleven days
after September 11th, Congress passed and the President signed into law a
compensation plan that will deliver as much as $6 billion to the victims and
victims' families"). See also Feinberg, supra note 127, at 548-49 ("Only in
America could you see this program. No other nation on earth will ever do
anything like this. We have never done anything like it before. But be careful
in agreeing with me. Read some of the letters I get: 'Dear Mr. Feinberg, my
daughter died in Oklahoma City. Where's my check?' 'Dear Mr. Feinberg, my
husband died in the African Embassy bombing in Kenya in '98. Where's my
check?' 'Dear Mr. Feinberg, my son died on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen by a
terrorist attack. How do I apply for the fund?' 'Dear Mr. Feinberg, I don't get
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represents a one-time legislative response in the wake of an
unprecedented foreign attack or a precedent for future compensation
mechanisms for victims of terrorism is impossible to know.14 If it is
a precedent for future compensation responses, then the federal
government serves as a camouflaged "insurer," albeit one that
collects premiums through taxation and spreads the risk of
terrorism losses over the general population through the general tax
revenue collection mechanism.
The ATSSA also capped the liability of the air carriers:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, liability for all
claims, whether for compensatory or punitive damages, arising
out of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11,
2001 against any air carrier shall not be in an amount greater
than the limits of the liability coverage maintained by the air
carrier. 135
Through this provision, Congress created an ex post limitation of
liability that had the effect of shifting the risk of loss exceeding the
airlines' liability limits to any victims of industry negligence, who in
turn were offered compensation through the Victim Compensation
it. My daughter died in the first World Trade Center in '93, committed by the
very same people. How come I'm not eligible?' And it doesn't stop there: 'Dear
Mr. Feinberg, last year my husband saved three little girls from drowning in
the Mississippi River. And then he went under, a hero. How do I apply to this
fund?' 'Dear Mr. Feinberg, my fourteen year old daughter was walking down
the street on the sidewalk when she was killed by a hit-and-run drunk driver.
How do I apply to the fund?' Can we justify, in a free society like ours, carving
out for special treatment a very small, defined group of people? Can we do that
fairly? Or when you step back from the emotion of it, do you say this is well-
intended, but it's a bad idea because we are making arbitrary distinctions
among American citizens? That is wrong. Bad public policy. Or do you say
9/11 is 'different,' and it justifies this type of special treatment? A unique
response to a very unique historical event.").
134. See Stewart, supra note 133, at 178 ("Given the highly unique
circumstances of the enactment of the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, there is no reason to believe that it will serve as a model for the
consideration of any future compensation programs."). Various members of
Congress introduced legislation in 2003, 2004, and 2005 to extend the Victim
Compensation Fund's original filing deadline of Dec. 22, 2003. See Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(a)(3). Legislation to
extend the deadline would have effectively expanded the number of claimants
entitled to seek recovery due to late-onset illnesses allegedly caused by exposure
to toxic substances released into the atmosphere on 9/11, but the legislation did
not pass. See Victim Compensation Fund Extension Act, H.R. 565, 109th Cong.
(2005); Victim Compensation Fund Extension Act, H.R. 5076, 108th Cong.
(2004); September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Extension Act of 2003, H.R.
3084, 108th Cong. (2003).
135. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(a).
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Fund. Stated otherwise, the airlines' liability risk was assumed by
the federal government.
Creating immunities from liability is a long-standing method of
government risk management. As David Moss documents, the
limited liability laws created by states in the nineteenth century for
passive investors in corporations had the effect of shifting the risk of
business failure from passive investors to creditors, and this risk
management policy was an indispensable ingredient of economic
progress when the United States was still a developing nation.36 In
the same vein, ATSSA's liability limitations should be understood as
reflecting Congress's judgment that limiting airlines' risk of liability
for claims arising out of 9/11 was an indispensable ingredient of
maintaining a solvent commercial airline industry, which is deemed
to be vital to the economic well-being of the nation.137 This risk-
management solution was, obviously, a federal policy; limiting
damages to the amount of liability insurance in force not only
offered a predictable outcome for damage awards but also served to
preempt any state law or rule to the contrary.
IV. DIFFICULT RISKS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION OF
THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE
Risk management occurs along a continuum that runs from pre-
loss prevention to post-loss remediation. In the pre-loss phase, risk
managers engage in ex ante prevention as well as planning to
reduce the consequences of loss should a future loss-causing event
occur. When prevention and mitigation efforts are no longer cost-
effective or adequate, risk managers consider mechanisms to
transfer risk in private insurance markets. In some circumstances
where private markets are unable to distribute risk adequately,
government intervention in those markets assists the process of risk
allocation. In fact, federal involvement to guarantee market
availability of specialized insurance products has several
precedents. 3 ' For example, as part of New Deal legislation,
136. See Moss, supra note 19, at 53-84.
137. 147 Cong. Rec. S9589, S9594 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of
Sen. McCain) ("We faced two unsatisfactory outcomes [without Congressional
action to limit airline liability after September 11]: 1. that the airlines, whose
liability insurance coverage is insufficient to cover all damage, would be
dissolved as their assets were sold to pay off their liability and/or; 2. some or all
of the victims who were injured or killed in this tragedy would receive no
compensation.").
138. See generally Terrorism Insurance: Alternative Programs for Protecting
Insurance Consumers, Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Thomas J. McCool, Managing
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, Government
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Congress passed the Federal Crop Insurance Act in 1938.139 Thirty
years later, Congress enacted the National Flood Insurance Act of
1968 to make flood insurance available to property owners in flood-
prone areas. 4 0 The federal government also has limited the liability
associated with nuclear power plant operations and overseas
investment. 141 The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, which
is an independent federal agency established to facilitate private
investment in developing countries by U.S. investors, offers
insurance against political risks. 4 2 It is also significant that federal
intervention to backstop terror risk is the approach followed by
other industrialized nations, including Spain, France, Germany,
Austria, the Netherlands, Australia, and the United Kingdom, 4 3 and
that New Zealand, Japan, France, Norway, and the Netherlands
have federal programs to help provide coverage for natural
disasters.
4 4
Not all potential losses can be redistributed in private
markets or in markets where government has intervened. This
sometimes results in post-loss remediation and compensation,
responses that exist at the other end of the risk-management
continuum. To achieve a cohesive, comprehensive public policy to
deal with the consequences of catastrophic disasters, coordination at
the federal level at all points along the continuum is essential.
Presently, with respect to natural disaster and terrorism
catastrophes, ex ante prevention and loss mitigation and ex post
compensation and remediation are predominantly, even if not
exclusively, federal activities. Achieving a comprehensive national
catastrophe policy will not be possible unless regulation of the risk
allocation piece of the risk management continuum is handled
federally, instead of on a state-by-state basis.
A. Terrorism
Consider first the risk of terrorism. The inherent
unpredictability of terrorism makes estimating terror risk
Accountability Office) ("The federal government's size and sovereign power
provide it with the unique ability to offer insurance when the private market is
unable or unwilling to do so."). See also JERRY, supra note 7, at 59.
139. See JERRY, supra note 7, at 59.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 59-60.
142. Id. at 60.
143. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 31. See also Anne
Soeffker, The Insurability of Terrorism Risk After September 11, 2001, 2005 ILJ
LEXIS 4 (2005) (comparing the federal responses to terrorism insurance in the
United States, Germany, and France).
144. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
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difficult. 145 Although some observers in the wake of 9/11 hoped that
available data on terrorism events 46 could be used to develop risk
models that could be used to price future coverage, 147 the experience
with such efforts during the last five years is not promising.
Fundamentally, modeling is imperfect because of ambiguity of both
frequency and consequence, which, as discussed above, are among
the characteristics of a difficult risk. In seeking to explain why the
uses to which the finite resources of DHS must be prioritized in the
nation's effort to disrupt terrorism, Secretary Michael Chertoff
described the terrorism risk as a combination of three complex
elements: threat, vulnerability, and consequence.148 Threat is the
ambiguity of frequency, which can be described more specifically as
"[t]he probability that a specific target is attacked in a specific way
during a specific time period." 49 The ambiguity of consequence is a
function of both vulnerability, which is "[t]he probability that
damages (where damages may involve fatalities, injuries, property
damage, or other consequences) occur, given a specific attack type,
at a specific time, on a given target,"5 ' and anticipated damage,
145. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 31. See also WHARTON
RISK MANAGEMENT AND DECISION PROCESSES CENTER, TRIA AND BEYOND:
TERRORISM RISK FINANCING IN THE U.S. 1 (2005) ("Insurers, indeed all
stakeholders, have difficulty dealing with the tremendous uncertainty of
terrorism risk. The likelihood of an attack is highly ambiguous and the attack
modality is subject only to the limitations of the terrorist's ingenuity.").
146. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1. See also National
Counterterrorism Center, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System,
http://wits.nctc.gov (compiling statistical data on the locations, times, dates,
targets, and victims of terrorist attacks around the globe) (last visited Aug. 31,
2006).
147. One of us cautiously expressed hope in early 2002 that such models
could be created. See Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Terrorism, and 9/11:
Reflections on Three Threshold Questions, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 95, 113 (2002).
Even government attempts to predict terrorism using a futures market
arrangement were proposed. Amid Furor, Pentagon Kills Terrorism Futures
Market, CNN.cOM, July 30, 2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
ALLPOLITICS/07/29/terror.market. The proposal failed as a result of harsh
criticism on Capitol Hill. Id.
148. Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security Secretary, Address at the 2005
Excellence in Government Conference (July 25, 2005), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4683 ("[WIith our finite
resources and our finite number of employees, we have to be able to focus
ourselves on those priorities which most demand our attention. And that
means we have to focus on risk. And what does that mean? It means we look to
consequence, it means we look to vulnerability, and it means we look to
threat.").
149. HENRY H. WILLIS ET AL., RAND CR. FOR TERRORISM RISK MGMT. POLICY,
ESTIMATING TERROR RISK 6 (2005).
150. Id. at 8.
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which is best explained as "[t]he expected magnitude of damage
(e.g., deaths, injuries, or property damage), given a specific attack
type, at a specific time, that results in damage to a specific target."5'
The fact that terror risk can be "reverse engineered" into
discrete elements offers little in the way of simplification. Although
what constitutes a threat can be described succinctly, "[a] complete
description of the threats to which a target is exposed would require
consideration of every mode of attack separately."'52 To take one
example, the terror threat to the New York Stock Exchange must be
described in terms of the infinite array of possible attack scenarios,
such as (a) threat of attack with a chemical agent; (b) threat of
attack with automatic weapons; (c) threat of attack with a chemical
agent and a concurrent assault with automatic weapons; (d) threat
of attack with a chemical agent and a concurrent assault with
automatic weapons, followed by a secondary cyber-blitz to
incapacitate communication networks; (e) etc., with the list
continuing ad infinitum. The complexity-and perhaps the
impossibility-of the task has led one scholar to suggest that "rather
than seek an optimal method for estimating [terror] risk, we seek a
method that leads us to make the least egregious errors in
decisionmaking across the range of possible scenarios that might
develop in the future." 3  Stated more bluntly, in an effort to
properly assess the future frequency and consequence of terrorism,
it may not be possible to "get it right," but only possible to get it the
"least wrong."
Given the uncertainties inherent in the risk of terrorism, only
the federal government has the capacity to reinsure or backstop a
catastrophic terrorist attack.14  The limitations of the state
regulatory system were apparent in the aftermath of 9/11 and before
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act ("TRIA")"' became law, a reality
that was readily acknowledged by state insurance commissioners
and its representative organization, the NAIC."6 Before TRIA was
151. Id. at 9.
152. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at xvii.
154. Mark A. Hofmann, Calls for TRIA Extension Growing Louder in Senate;
But Bill, Introduced in July, Still Awaits Markup, Bus. INS., Sept. 27, 2004, at 1
(quoting Albert R. Counselman, a past chairman of the Council of Insurance
Agents & Brokers, who stated that "[t]he need for federal action in the area of
terrorism coverage is a clear example of the limits of state regulation").
155. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116
Stat. 2322.
156. Meg Fletcher, NAIC Discusses Need for Terrorism Insurance Relief,
Insurance Regulators Facing Pressure to Find Solution to Coverage Problems,
Bus. INS., Dec. 17, 2001, at 4 ("[M]any insurers are asking individual state
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enacted, the NAIC made it very clear that, absent intervention by
the federal government, most states would approve terrorism
exclusions for insurance policies. 157 Excluding terrorism coverage
from commercial insurance lines would have led to a cascade of
market problems, the effects of which would have been felt
nationally. 158 In the months immediately following the 9/11 attacks
commissioners to approve new policy endorsements that would exclude losses
from terrorist activities. Responding to widespread uncertainty in the market,
the Kansas City, Missouri-based NAIC canceled its fall quarterly meeting in
late September [2001] and instead held a special meeting in Washington to
discuss how best to cope with the industry's situation. The NAIC in October
issued a statement of principles for federal terrorism insurance relief and
continues to encourage federal lawmakers to include those points in proposed
legislation, though the NAIC has not endorsed any proposal now before
Congress.").
157. Michele Heller & 'Nicole Duran, NAIC Set to Approve Terrorism
Exclusions, AM. BANKER, Dec. 18, 2001, at 20. NAIC leadership testified on
Capitol Hill in October 2001 urging Congress to ensure the availability of
terrorism insurance through federal intervention:
NAIC and its members believe there is presently a need for the
federal government, working with the state regulatory system, to
provide appropriate financial back-up to the private insurance market
in order to assure that our nation's economy does not falter due to a
lack of insurance coverage for terrorism.
The Role of the Federal Government in Assuring that Insurance for Terrorist
Acts Remains Available to American Consumers: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
On Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. 2 (2001) (statement of
Diane Koken, Comm'r of Insurance, Nat'l Ass'n of Insurance Comm'rs.).
158. Testifying before Congress in October 2001, the president of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce described the range of possible macro-economic
consequences if terrorism insurance were unavailable:
This market disruption caused by a lack of terrorism insurance
coverage, if it is not provided, could have deep and potentially
devastating effects. Let me list them quickly. First, businesses that
cannot get the coverage may have to cut back their operations or stop
what they are doing in a particular business area; trucking firms,
railroads, airlines, ships, may all be compelled to say, I am not going
to carry this, I am not going to go there, I am going to limit my
business activities to protect my interests or to meet the requirements
of my bank or my other financial partners.
Second, the lack of such coverage could prevent many businesses
from obtaining financing ....
It is very clear that if we are sitting here a year from now and
some terrible, horrific thing happens ... every single one of the major
casualty insurance companies in this country are going to go
bankrupt.
Terrorist Risk Insurance: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 162 (2001) (statement of Thomas J. Donohue,
President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). The lack of terrorism insurance did
affect the credit ratings for some prominent commercial real estate. See
generally Joseph B. Treaster, Ratings of Building Loans Fall on Insurance
Worries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at C14 ("A leading credit rating agency said
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prior to the enactment of TRIA, many insurance markets did
experience serious contraction in available coverage; in geographic
locations where the risk of terrorism was high, such as New York,
only a fraction of providers offered terrorism coverage, or coverage
was available at exceedingly high prices. 59 In addition, inconsistent
state policies in the wake of 9/11 exacerbated variations in the
states with respect to product availability and price.160 In 2002, the
NAIC recommended the approval in all jurisdictions of terrorism
exclusions, and by August 2002, forty-five states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico had approved them. 6 1 Although only
California, New York, Georgia, Texas, and Florida withheld
approval of the exclusions, 62 because most insurers operate across
jurisdictions, the lack of national uniformity was extremely
problematic for insurers.' 63 One of the successes of TRIA was that it
... that it had downgraded the ratings on $4.5 billion in loans on some of the
most prominent office buildings in New York City because the buildings were
not adequately insured against terrorism.... Among those downgraded in New
York were loans on Rockefeller Center, the Cond6 Nast Building . .. the
headquarters of Citigroup . . . and the Marriott Marquis Hotel in Times
Square."). In August 2004, the Citigroup building was cited by the Secretary of
Homeland Security as a potential terror target. See Tom Ridge, Secretary of
Homeland Security, Remarks Regarding Recent Threat Reports (Aug. 1, 2004)
available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=3870.
The Department of Justice would later indict three individuals in connection
with an alleged terror plot that formed the basis of the August 2004 warnings.
See David Johnson & Eric Lichtblau, 3 Indicted in Suspected Plot on East Coast
Finance Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A12.
159. See E.E. Mazier, Terrorism Cover Up in Air While Congress Battles
Over Backstop, NAT'L. UNDERWRITER, Nov. 4, 2002, at 10 ("With no federal
terrorism backstop officially in place, terrorism coverage continues to be offered
by very few companies at very high prices."). See also Gavin Souter & Paul
Winston, Terrorism Reinsurance Available-For the Right Price, Bus. INS., Sept.
23, 2002, at 21 ("Reinsurers are still unwilling to offer comprehensive coverage
for terrorism exposures, but, for a price, several are offering limited capacity for
such risks."); Joseph B. Treaster, Insurers Are Taking Advantage of New York,
City Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at B10 ("[Olne reason for the high
cost of commercial insurance in New York was that special coverage for
terrorism-which had been free before the World Trade Center attack and is
now sold separately-has become expensive and hard to find.").
160. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 31.
161. ROBERT P. HARTWIG, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, SEPTEMBER 11,
2001: THE FIRST YEAR 10. See also Meg Fletcher, Differing State Stances Muddy
Coverage Issues; California Nixes Exclusion for Terrorism Risks, Bus. INS., Jan.
14, 2002, at 1.
162. HARTWIG, supra note 161, at 10-11.
163. Fletcher, supra note 161, at 1 (quoting Robert W. Esenberg, a former
President of the Risk & Insurance Society, as describing the situation as "a
nightmare for entities that operate in multiple states and countries").
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prevented the continuation of a patchwork of inconsistent state
policies and their negative impacts on product availability and
price.'6 By preempting state regulation and supporting uniform
availability of coverage, TRIA created cohesion between insurance
regulation and a fundamental premise of homeland security policy:
every state is home to potential targets, making terrorism a
national challenge that demands national solutions.166
It was for these reasons, among others, that the federal
government intervened and enacted the TRIA in November 2002.167
Congress could have established a permanent federal fixture for
regulating the business of insurance, but TRIA does not do this.
Instead, Congress expressed a preference for market forces over
permanent government involvement when articulating TRIA's
purpose as establishing "a temporary Federal program that provides
for a transparent system of shared public and private compensation
for insured losses resulting from acts of terrorism.168
The initial enactment of TRIA was scheduled to sunset on
December 31, 2005, a date by which Congress hoped the market
would no longer need federal intervention. 169  Because a robust
terrorism insurance market did not develop by the end of 2005,17°
164. See Oversight of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Robert J. Lowe, Chairman of the Real Estate Roundtable).
165. Many of these targets represent a special class of targets known as
critical infrastructures. See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY
ASSETS (2003).
166. Steven R. Pozzi, What Should TRIA Look Like, NAT'L. UNDERWRITER,
Sept. 6, 2004, at 28 ("Terrorism is a national problem; the insurance solution
should be national as well.").
167. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat
2322 (2002), amended by Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-144, 119 Stat. 2660 (2005).
168. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 101(b). See also id. § 101(a)(6)
("[Tihe United States Government should provide temporary financial
compensation to insured parties, contributing to the stabilization of the United
States economy in a time of national crisis, while the financial services industry
develops the systems, mechanisms, products, and programs necessary to create
a viable financial services market for private terrorism risk insurance.").
169. Id. § 108(a). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-307,
TERRORISM INSURANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT
OF 2002 29 (2004) ("Congress's second objective [in passing TRIAl was to give
the insurance industry a transitional period during which it could begin pricing
terrorism risks and developing ways to provide such insurance after TRIA
expires.").
170. Structured Finance Special Report, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, Apr.
28, 2005, at 2 ("Moody's is unaware of any viable private market initiative that
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and acknowledging concerns that terrorism coverage would
disappear if TRIA were not renewed, 7 1 on December 22, 2005,
Congress renewed TRIA-again only temporarily-until December
31, 2007.172
Although TRIA has its detractors, 72 there is little doubt that the
law has made terrorism insurance obtainable and generally
affordable. 17  The general framework of TRIA requires that the
federal government act as an insurer of last resort for acts of
175terrorism certified by the Secretary of the Treasury, after
consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.
17
would take the place of TRIA.... A limited number of stand alone insurers will
probably always be in the market willing to write policies at high prices, but
probably not enough to fill the demand for capacity."); see also U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 169, at 30 ("Unfortunately, insurers and
reinsurers still have not found a reliable method for pricing terrorism
insurance, and although TRIA has provided reinsurers the opportunity to
reenter the market to a limited extent, industry participants have not
developed a mechanism to replace TRIA.").
171. A broad range of groups lobbied Congress and the White House to
extend TRIA. See Letter from the Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism to
President George W. Bush (June 8, 2005), available at
http://www.insureagainstterrorism.org/june8letter.pdf. See also Press Release,
American Acad. of Actuaries, Actuarial Analysis Concludes "Permanent"
Solution Needed for Economic Consequences of Terrorist Acts (Dec. 2, 2005),
available at http://www.actuary.org/newsroom/pdf/tria-120205.pdf; Letter from
Nat'l Governors Ass'n to Senator Frist, Senator Reid, Representative Hastert,
and Representative Pelosi (Dec. 13, 2005) (on file with author).
172. Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 § 108(a).
173. PETER CHALK ET AL., RAND CTR. FOR TERRORISM RISK MGMT. POLICY,
TRENDS IN TERRORISM: THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE FUTURE OF THE
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT xvi (2005) ("TRIA does not provide adequate
financial protection, particularly in the face of economically motivated
attacks.").
174. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 169, at 29 ("Since TRIA
was enacted in November 2002, terrorism insurance generally has been
available to businesses."). See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, ASSESSMENT:
THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002 5 (2005) [hereinafter TREASURY
REPORT] ("TRIA was effective in terms of the purposes it was designed to
achieve. TRIA provided a transitional period during which insurers had
enhanced financial capacity to write terrorism risk insurance coverage.").
175. TRIA pertains only to acts of terrorism "committed by an individual or
individuals acting on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest."
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-297, § 102(1)(A)(iv), 116
Stat 2324 (2002). Arguably, this is a shortsighted aspect of the law, as domestic
terrorists-such as hate groups, right-wing militia organizations, and animal
rights and environmental extremists-continue to pose a threat to the United
States. See Steven Roberts, Threats Persist Here, NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 27, 2006, at
23.
176. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 102(1)(A). The Secretary of the
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Compensation under TRIA is restricted geographically: the insured
loss must occur inside the United States, with an exception for
terrorism that occurs on air carriers and United States flag
vessels. 77
The practical application of TRIA is complex. Several events
must occur before federal funds become eligible. First, the terrorist
act must exceed a loss threshold, known as a "program trigger."178
For losses certified by the Secretary of the Treasury that occur after
March 31, 2006, but before December 31, 2006, the insurance
industry's aggregate loss amount must exceed $50,000,000.179 For
any losses certified by the Secretary of the Treasury that occur on or
after January 1, 2007, until the expiration of TRIA on December 31,
2007, the insurance industry's aggregate loss amount must exceed
$100,000,000.18° Second, insurance providers must meet individual
insurer deductibles derived from a prescribed formula." From
January 1, 2006, through December 31, 2006, the insurer deductible
is "the value of an insurer's direct earned premiums over the
calendar year immediately preceding [year 2006], multiplied by 17.5
percent."1 2 From January 1, 2007, until the expiration of TRIA on
December 31, 2007, the insurer deductible is "the value of an
insurer's direct earned premiums over the calendar year
immediately preceding [year 2007], multiplied by 20 percent."18 A
certified loss that does not exceed the deductible amount will not
trigger a government payout.
8 4
Assuming the program trigger is met and the loss exceeds the
individual insurer's prescribed deductible, federal payments will be
made; however, payments are limited to only a percentage of the
losses that exceed the deductible.85 For claims that arise during
2006, the government will pay 90%,"16 and for claims that arise
during 2007, the government will pay 85%.187 For example, if the
total losses in 2006 for insurer X are $1 billion, and if insurer X's
Treasury serves as the overall administrator of TRIA. Id. § 103(a)(2).
177. Id. § 102(5).
178. Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-144, §
103(e)(1)(B), 119 Stat 2662 (2005).
179. Id. § 103(e)(1)(B)(i).
180. Id. § 103(e)(1)(B)(ii).
181. Id. § 102(7)(E).
182. Id.
183. Id. § 102(7)(F).
184. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat
2322 (2002)
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 § 103(e)(1)(B).
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requisite deductible-using the prescribed formula-is $500 million,
the federal government will pay 90% of the losses exceeding the
$500 million deductible, or $450 million. The remaining 10% of the
loss, or $50 million, must be paid by the insurer as a co-payment.
The sharing of the financial burden effectuates the intent of
Congress to make TRIA "a transparent system of shared public and
private compensation for insured losses."88
If and only if federal payments are made, TRIA obligates the
government to recover some of the payments using a surcharge that
is applied industry-wide; this recovery is known as the "mandatory
recoupment amount."18 9 To do this, TRIA establishes an "insurance
marketplace aggregate retention amount" for each year.190 For 2006,
the aggregate retention amount is $25 billion,' and this amount
increases to $27.5 billion in 2007.192 If the sum of all insurers'
deductibles and co-pays-known as the "aggregate industry
retention"-is below the aggregate retention amount established by
statute, then the federal government must recoup the difference. 1
93
To do so, the Secretary of the Treasury must impose a surcharge on
policyholders not to exceed three percent.19 If the sum of
deductibles and co-pays exceed the insurance marketplace aggregate
retention amount, then the federal government is not required to
recoup payments made pursuant to TRIA,' 95 but may do so at the
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury.
196
188. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 101(b) (emphasis added).
189. Id. § 103(e)(7).
190. Id. § 103(e)(6).
191. Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 § 103(e)(6)(D).
192. Id. § 103(e)(6)(E).
193. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 §103(e)(7).
194. Id. § 103(e)(8)(C).
195. Id. § 103(e)(7)(B).
196. Id. § 103(e)(7)(D). Understanding the practical operation of TRIA-and
especially the law's complicated recoupment provisions-can be illustrated by
way of examples:
Example 1: Terrorists attack Washington, D.C. The Secretary of the
Treasury certifies that the loss exceeds $50,000,000. Policies held by insurance
company X total $1,000,000,000. To be eligible for federal assistance, X must
meet its statutorily prescribed deductible of $500,000,000, which it does. As a
result, the federal government will cover 90 percent of the remaining
$500,000,000, the difference between X's total loss and its deductible. As noted,
the remaining 10 percent, or $50,000,000, is tantamount to a co-pay and is the
financial responsibility of the insurer. Further assume that the total amount of
money the insurance industry must pay-the collective sum of individual
company deductibles and co-pays-is $20,000,000,000, $5,000,000,000 short of
the statutorily prescribed industry retention amount of $25,000,000,000. The
government must recoup the $5,000,000,000 by imposing a surcharge of up to
three percent on policyholder premiums.
2006 873
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
TRIA also caps the federal government's total claim liability at
$100 billion.197 If total losses exceed that amount, the Secretary
must inform Congress and "the Congress shall determine the
procedures for and the source of any payments for such excess
insured losses."198 In return for backstopping industry's insured
losses, TRIA requires insurers to offer terrorism coverage to
property and casualty policyholders. 199  This "make available"
provision of TRIA200 is a significant aspect of the law, which has been
administratively clarified by the Department of the Treasury in a
final rule.2'
Notwithstanding TRIA's deference, with some limitations, to
the states' authority to regulate the business of insurance,2 2 TRIA
expressly preempts some significant aspects of state law. TRIA
preempts and voids state action that would authorize insurance
providers to exclude terrorism coverage from property and casualty
insurance products. 23  This provision is a direct response to the
action of state insurance commissioners who authorized such
exclusions prior to the enactment of TRIA in November 2002.04 In
addition, TRIA preempts any state regulatory action that
Example 2: Terrorists attack Washington, D.C. The Secretary of the
Treasury certifies that the loss exceeds $50,000,000. Policies held by insurance
company X total $1,000,000,000. To be eligible for federal assistance, X must
meet its statutorily prescribed deductible of $500,000,000, which it does. As a
result, the federal government will cover 90 percent of the remaining
$500,000,000, the difference between X's total loss and its deductible. As noted,
the remaining 10 percent, or $50,000,000, is tantamount to a co-pay and is the
financial responsibility of the insurer. Further assume that the total amount of
money the insurance industry must pay-the collective sum of individual
company deductibles and co-pays-is $26,000,000,000, $1,000,000,000 greater
than the statutorily prescribed industry retention amount of $25,000,000,000.
As a result, recoupment is discretionary.
197. Id. § 103(e)(2)(A)(i). Additionally, "no insurer that has met its insurer
deductible shall be liable for the payment of any portion of that amount that
exceeds $100,000,000,000." Id. § 103(e)(2)(A)(ii).
198. Id. § 103(e)(3).
199. Id. § 103(c).
200. Id.
201. Terrorism Risk Insurance Program: Disclosures and Mandatory
Availability Requirements, 68 Fed. Reg. 59,720 (2003). The fact that terrorism
coverage is available, however, does not imply that consumers have actually
purchased coverage. See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 169, at
23 ("Although TRIA improved the availability of terrorism insurance, relatively
few policyholders have purchased terrorism coverage.").
202. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 §106(a) ("Nothing in this title
shall affect the jurisdiction or regulatory authority of the insurance
commissioner... of any State over any insurer or other person ... .
203. Id. § 105(b).
204. See Fletcher, supra note 156, at 1.
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individually defines or alters the term "act of terrorism" in any
manner inconsistent with the definition in § 102.205
One of the most important features of TRIA is its requirement
that the President's Working Group on Financial Markets is
required to study and report on long-term terrorism insurance
affordability and availability issues.00 This report, which is due in
September 2006, will undoubtedly address the extent to which
federal involvement is needed to secure a long-term solution to the
problem of terrorism insurance availability.
B. Natural Disasters
To date, except for the creation of the national flood insurance
program in 1968, the federal government has not intervened in
insurance markets to enhance coverage availability for victims of
natural disasters. Although the flood insurance program has
serious deficiencies, 27 no one seriously suggests that management of
this market should revert to the states. The consequences of the
2004 and 2005 hurricane systems, the recognition that the record
economic losses would have been much worse had the major storms
of those seasons not weakened before making their landfalls, and
the prospect of increased hurricane activity in 2006 and subsequent
hurricane seasons are all causing the absence of a comprehensive
strategy for insuring natural disaster risk to be reconsidered. After
Hurricane Katrina, the Florida Insurance Commissioner publicly
urged the creation of a national catastrophe fund,208 and this call
was followed by a summit on national catastrophe insurance,
convened by the state insurance commissioners of California,
Florida, Illinois, and New York, and attended by industry
representatives, lawmakers, insurance consumers, and public policy
experts in San Francisco in November 2005.209 As of the spring of
2006, several bills had been proposed in Congress to address the
lack of coverage, including measures that would create a federal
backstop for the insurance industry's national catastrophe losses, or
create a federal catastrophe reinsurance program, or authorize
insurers to set aside reserves for future catastrophes on a tax-
deferred basis.210
205. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 106(a)(2)(A).
206. Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005 § 108(e)(1).
207. For a recent summary of difficulties facing the federal flood insurance
program, see Christopher Drew & Joseph B. Treaster, Politics Stalls Plan to
Bolster Flood Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006, Al.
208. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
209. See Patricia-Anne Tom, Insurance Commissioners Announce
Framework for National Cat Program, INS. J., Dec. 5, 2005.
210. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
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While discussions over the contours of catastrophe insurance
continue, the prospects for affordability and availability of coverage
are, at best, difficult. In the wake of the 2004 and 2005 hurricane
seasons, property insurance availability for hurricanes is a serious
problem in coastal counties along the eastern seaboard, the Gulf
coast, and throughout the state of Florida. As of spring 2006, most
Florida insurers had stopped writing homeowners coverage, leaving
property owners without preexisting coverage with the prospect of
purchasing much more expensive coverage through Citizens
Property Insurance Corporation, the state-created insurer of last
resort, which is now the state's second largest insurer. At the end of
the 2005 hurricane season, however, Citizens had accumulated a
$1.7 billion deficit, causing Florida lawmakers to struggle over a
relief package for the troubled insurer. On the last day of the 2006
legislative session, the Florida legislature passed a bill to help
bolster the property insurance market in the state, which included
setting aside $715 million of general state revenues to wipe out a
portion of the company's deficit and steep rate hikes for
policyholders.21' In addition, reinsurance rates are increasing
between 30% and 150% for property insurance in states vulnerable
to hurricanes.212  The Mississippi Windstorm Association, which
insures property in Mississippi's coastal areas, is facing a
reinsurance rate increase for 2006 of 488%.213 Early in 2006, the
prospects for the emergence of permanent state-based solutions to
the developing crisis in availability and affordability of coverage
were dim.
V. INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A NATIONAL
CATASTROPHE POLICY
From prevention to compensation, the challenges posed by
difficult risks are huge. The ex post costs of difficult risks are
massive. For example, within ten days after Hurricane Katrina
came ashore with devastating consequences for New Orleans and
the adjacent coastal areas in Mississippi and Alabama, Congress
appropriated over $62 billion in disaster aid-which is considerably
more than the total annual budget of the entire Department of
Homeland Security.214 Additional funding is included in budget
211. S. 1980, 108th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 44 (Fla. 2006). See also
Florida Senate, Senate Calendar: Friday, May 5, 2006, available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2006/Senate/Calendars/Daily/sc0505O6.pdf
at 6 (indicating that Florida Senate Bill 1980 was passed on May 5, 2006, the
last day of Florida's 2006 legislative session).
212. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 1.
213. Id.
214. Jackie Calmes, Much of Katrina Aid Remains Unspent, Wall St. J., Oct.
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legislation being considered in the Congress in early May 2006,211
and total government expenditures could eventually exceed $200
billion. The ex ante gaps in prevention and mitigation of loss are
significant. For example, a study by the LSU Hurricane Center
estimated that if four mitigation measures had been in place before
Hurricane Katrina-additional protection on openings (impact
resistant shutters or laminated glass systems), improved connection
of the roof deck, installation of hurricane straps, and secondary
moisture protection of the roof deck-75% of the estimated losses
due to the hurricane could have been avoided.216  In the markets
where risk is transferred and distributed, the deficiencies are large.
For example, despite the availability of federally backed flood
insurance, the percentage of homes with flood insurance policies in
the coastal parishes of Louisiana affected by Hurricane Katrina
ranged from 7% in St. James Parish to 57.7% in St. Bernard Parish,
217
with only 40% of homes in Orleans Parish having this coverage.
In short, as Hurricane Katrina demonstrates so clearly, our nation
lacks a comprehensive, cohesive, forward-looking national
catastrophe policy.
The discussion in this paper has focused on insurance, which is
a fundamental and indispensable ingredient in the overall program
of compensating loss and rebuilding after a disaster strikes. In the
final analysis, however, the enormous challenges presented by
difficult risks can only be addressed through a coordinated,
comprehensive system that melds ex ante preventive and mitigation
measures, insurance mechanisms, and ex post compensation
mechanisms into a coordinated national policy.218 The details of how
25, 2005, at A4. The President's budget request for the Department of
Homeland Security for FY2007 was $42.7 billion. See http://www.dhs.gov/
interweb/assetlibrary/BudgetBIB-FY2007.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
215. Id.
216. LSU HURRICANE CTR., RESIDENTIAL WIND DAMAGE IN HURRICANE
KATRINA: PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES AND POTENTIAL Loss REDUCTION THROUGH
IMPROVED BUILDING CODES AND CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES ii (2005), available at
http://hurricane.lsu.edu/files/katrinafinal.pdf (last visited May 6, 2006).
217. The Future of the National Flood Insurance Program: Testimony Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 9 (Oct. 18, 2005)
(testimony of Robert P. Hartwig, Insurance Information Institute), available at
http://server.iii.org/yy-objdata/binary/745025-1-0/NFIPTestimony.pdf.
218. See generally Howard Kunreuther, Has the Time Come for
Comprehensive Natural Disaster Insurance?, in ON RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS
FROM HURRICANE KATRINA (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2006); HOWARD
KUNREUTHER & RICHARD ROTH, SR., PAYING THE PRICE: THE STATUS AND ROLE OF
INSURANCE AGAINST NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (1998) ("Our
position is that the economic costs of natural disasters to the nation are too high
and are likely to soar in the future unless some steps are taken to change recent
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such a program might work are beyond the scope of this discussion,
but its contours should include national building codes (presumably
in the form of minimum standards to which state and local
government authorities would be asked to conform, perhaps as a
condition of eligibility for federal disaster assistance), incentives
(perhaps in the form of tax credits and low-interest loans) to retrofit
existing construction, land-use and zoning regulation
(predominantly the province of the states, but, given the magnitude
of the problems posed by difficult risks, perhaps an area where
uniform federal standards may be required), insurance pricing that
rewards risk reduction in construction and retrofitting, the creation
of larger risk pools that diffuse risk over different hazards in
different regions (which requires federal coordination), and a federal
backstop that stabilizes private insurance markets and provides a
promise of compensation when the consequences of a disaster
exceeds the risk distribution capabilities of private markets. If the
insurance piece of the comprehensive regulatory policy is to fit, its
shape must be determined through an enhanced federal role in the
regulation of the business of insurance.
trends. Insurers can address these problems in a constructive manner only
through joint efforts with other stakeholders, and through the use of strategies
that combine insurance with monetary incentives, fines, tax credits,
well-enforced building codes, and land-use regulations For example, one way to
reduce future losses is to utilize insurance with well-enforced building codes
and land-use regulations to successfully reduce losses.").
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